Marx's Religious Theories

Karl Marx’s view of religion is clearly trying to make an undiluted point about the practice’s flaws, which it certainly has, but glosses over a few details that, if noted, make his case seem far too harsh. His opening argument is true enough, specifically that “Man makes religion, religion does not make man”. Whether there is some form of higher power or not in this world, it was up to human kind to organize belief systems, mythologies, and rituals around it.

He is also correct, to, a degree, in that, while preoccupied with notions of salvation through piety, oppressed people will never bother going through the trouble of revolution in their real world, revolution that Marx so desired. But that degree is what has not been addressed. Marx says that “To call on [the people] to give up their illusions about their condition is to call on them to give up a condition that requires illusions” in other words, when their “heartless world” is stripped bare of religion, or, all the beliefs that make it bearable, their eyes will be opened to how terrible their lives really are, and how necessary change is.

Losing faith in such comforts as divine retribution and the promise of an afterlife can prompt one to take justice into their own hands, and enjoy their time living rather than count on an eternity after they’ve died. These ideas play to the numerous people who call themselves religious simply out of convenience. Believing in and praying to a God is, in most cases, far easier than starting a revolution. This subgroup of more casual worshippers, if relieved of their “illusions”, are far more likely to wallow in depression, bereft even of hope, than to get up and do something, and this group, especially in today’s society, is far larger than many would expect.

Overall, though, saying that someone has religion is an incredibly over-generalized statement. There are many ways in which a person can express or not express their beliefs in a specific religion, and therefore, there is a whole spectrum composed of different people’s levels of dedication, and these all will react differently to Marx’s suggested abolition. There are those who have no religion, therefore no “illusions”, and are still content with their reality. Also, in direct opposition with Marx’s claim that religion keeps mankind complacent, unwilling to start fighting or induce change, there are those who fight and revolt for their religion, as seen most clearly in the Muslim world.

In this sense, though calling religion “the opium of the people” is, a strong and vivid metaphor, it’s only about half-right, and the following assumption that a world without the stagnation of religion means a world of change is a very big stretch to make. True, a good half of the religious population are blinded by their devotion, but when that is removed, those same people are very unlikely to have the will left to incite change, without something to believe in, which shoots holes in Marx’ result theory already. More gaps appear in this idea when one examines those violent and revolutionary religious cultures, which may have what he calls “illusions”, but are not lulled into pacifism by them. Lastly, a great majority of those people already lacking in religion find, without it, still no reason for fighting.

Marx’s intention with this essay was to bring about a time of reformation, and he used the imperfections of religion as his medium to reach as many as he could, yet the two are hardly related, because when change is truly necessary, it will happen with or without an affiliation to any God.